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AMERICAN INDIAN LAW MEETS THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE: WARBUS V. COMMISSIONER
Erik M. Jensen*
The relationship of the Internal Revenue Code to American Indians
is not a hot topic in the academy for obvious reasons. Most Indian law
scholars, like most scholars generally, avoid federal tax issues like the
plague,l and very few tax scholars dip into the American Indian law
literature.2
That is unfortunate. Federal tax law and American Indian law can
intersect in fascinating ways. A recent Tax Court decision, Warbus v.
Commissioner,3 is unlikely to attract scrutiny in the practitioner journals
since it involves the interpretation of a specialized Code provision,
Section 7873, that few practitioners will ever come across. But it presents
issues ranging from the mundane to the marvelous, 4 and it raises im-
portant questions about the judicial system's difficulty in handling cases,
even those that are factually simple, if the disputes implicate more than
one legal specialty. 5
Relying on Section 7873, which provides an exemption for income
from "fishing rights-related activit[ies]," 6 Warbus, a member of the
Lummi Nation, did not pay tax on discharge of indebtedness (DOI)
income arising from the foreclosure of his fishing boat. His position was
plausible, and it deserved serious consideration. Nevertheless, Special
Trial Judge John F. Dean rejected it in a strikingly cursory opinion, an
opinion adopted by the Tax Court.7 The American Indian law flavor of
the case was apparent since Section 7873 has no effect outside the Indian
law context. But Judge Dean's opinion is bereft of references to basic
American Indian law doctrine, including the so-called "canons of
construction" that often play a controlling role in this area. 8
* David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. The author is grateful
to Jon Entin, who made his usual incredibly helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Judy Kaul,
who ran down documents from the Warbus Tax Court file.
1. The phrase "tax issues like the plague" is not supposed to suggest that the plague is a tax issue,
although the plague might have estate-planning implications. My point is that American Indian law
professors spend very little time on federal tax issues although state power to tax within Indian country
comes up all the time in the typical introductory course.
2. One notable exception is Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax
Legislative Process, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (1994). See Erik M. Jensen, American Indian Tribes and
401(k) Plans, 68 TAx NOTES 117 (1995).
3. 110 T.C. 279 (1998).
4. See generally, Id. at 281-82.
5. The tax law/Indian law nexus is unusual, but everyone is familiar with fights about whether a
case is grounded in tort or in contract.
6. I.R.C. § 7873 (1994).
7. The jurisdiction of Special Trial Judges is set out in Internal Revenue Code Section 7443A(b)
and Tax Court Rules 180 through 188.
8. See infra Part II A.
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If Warbus were a throwaway case, it would deserve little notice. But
it is not. Warbus is a published opinion of the Tax Court, and it is
intended to have precedential effect. 9 Since Section 7873 has not been
the subject of prior judicial decisions, Warbus could have enormous
effect in developing the understanding of that section.1 0 Even more
important, Warbus could come to stand for the proposition that the Tax
Court can ignore American Indian law principles in tax disputes that
involve Indian tribes or Indian tribal members.
I will show why none of that should happen. Warbus deserves to be
discarded as precedent for at least two reasons. First, as I have noted, the
opinion shows no awareness of fundamental American Indian law
principles. Second, the decision is flawed even in its narrow, more
technical aspects. In particular, the court did an inadequate job on the
issues that should have been evident to any tax lawyer reading Section
7873. In fact, I will show how the judge misread the statute.
I emphasize that my criticisms of Warbus are based on professional
concerns about the opinion and what it could mean for the development
of the law. I am afraid that at times I may seem unfair to Judge Dean.
Many of the problems in the opinion were not his fault. Judge Dean
received little or no guidance from the litigants on some critical points,
especially the basics of American Indian law. But regardless of where
the fault lies, strong criticism is necessary to demonstrate why Warbus
should be disregarded in later disputes arising from the intersection of
American Indian law and federal tax law.
I. WARBUS V. COMMISSIONER: THE FACTS AND THE CODE
Around 1984, Warbus, a member of the Lummi Nation, bought a
fishing boat, the Denise W, a purchase financed partly through borrow-
ing from a commercial lender and partly by Warbus's note issued to the
9. There is a neverending dispute within the Tax Court about the precedential effect of the
court's not-officially-published "memorandum opinions," which "are supposed to be limited to those
having no value as precedent [(i.e.,] any case decided solely upon the authority of another, cases
involving subjects already well covered by opinions appearing in the bound volumes of the reports,
failure of proof cases and some others." J. Edgar Murdock, What Has the Tax Court of the United
States Been Doing?, 31 A.B.A. J. 297, 299 (1945); see Mark F. Sommer & Anne D. Waters, Tax Court
Memorandum Opinions-What Are They Worth?, 80 TAX NOTES 384 (1998); see also RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGES AND REFORM 163 n.9 (1996) (collecting commentary). What-
ever the value of memorandum opinions, however, a published opinion like Warbus is unquestionably
precedent.
10. The only published authority on Section 7873 before Warbus was Notice 89-34, 1989-1 C.B.
674, which set out the government's position on some matters that are not directly relevant to this
article. In Kieffer v. Commissioner, No. 9404-96, 1998 WL 281900 (T.C. June 6, 1998), decided
shortly after Warbus, Judge Dean had occasion to cite Section 7873 once again, concluding inter
alia-in what must be the least controversial ruling of the year-that income from timber sales is not
income from a "fishing rights-related activity."
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boat's former owner.11 In 1984, Warbus borrowed another $50,000
from the commercial lender, a loan secured by the Denise W.12 The pro-
ceeds were used, among other things, to acquire a salmon net, to make a
payment on the earlier loan, and to make insurance and mortgage pay-
ments.13 The Bureau of Indian Affairs guaranteed the $50,000 loan.14
From 1986 until 1991, Warbus was engaged in tribal fishing activity
protected by the Treaty of Point Elliott, 15 and Warbus used the Denise W
in that activity.16 However, around 1993, Warbus defaulted on the
$50,000 loan. 17 The boat was repossessed, and in 1993 BIA had to ful-
fill its obligation as guarantor, paying over $13,506, partly principal and
partly interest, to the lender.18  The BIA sent Warbus the appropriate
form (a "1099") to indicate that he had $13,506 in DOI income. 19
Warbus did not report the DOI income. In fact, he did not file a tax
return or pay estimated taxes for 1993.20 Since Warbus conceded that
he had had rental income of $6,000 and self-employment income of
$3,700 in that year, and he therefore unquestionably owed some tax,
Warbus was not the most sympathetic litigant. 21 Nevertheless, although
the fisherman's hands were not very clean, the proper tax treatment of
the DOI income was a legitimate issue on its own.
Under traditional tax analysis, Warbus had taxable income from the
discharge of indebtedness. He had borrowed money tax-free, and later
he was relieved of the obligation to repay some of the borrowed dollars.
That is the classic scenario for DOI income: you do not have to report
the dollars when received because you are obligated to pay them back.
However, if you are later released from the payback obligation, you then
I1. Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279, 280 (1998).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 280-81.
14. Id. at 281.
15. The treaty was signed in 1855 by the United States and a number of tribes, including the
Lummi Nation, in the Washington Territory, and was ratified by the Senate in 1859. Treaty Between
the United States and the DwAmish, Suqutimish, and Other Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians in
Washington Territory, 12 Stat. 927 (1859). Article V provides:
The right of taking fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further
secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting
temporary houses for the purpose of curing, together with the privilege of hunting and
gathering roots and berries on open and unclaimed lands. Provided, however, that they
shall not take shell-fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens.
Id. at 928.
16. Warbus, I 10 T.C. at 281.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Trial Memorandum for Respondent, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (No. 2194-96).
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have income. In effect, DOI income represents a deferred inclusion of
previously untaxed loan proceeds.
There may have been a discharge of indebtedness, or something
substantively similar, 22 but Warbus could point to a special Internal
Revenue Code section that arguably applied to his situation. Section
7873, added to the Code in 1988, provides in pertinent part that "no tax
shall be imposed . .. on income derived . . . by a member of an Indian
tribe directly or through a qualified Indian entity . . . from a fishing
rights-related activity of such tribe." 23
That is my case, argued Warbus. And the government conceded
that, between 1986 and 1991, Warbus was engaged in a "fishing rights-
related activity," which is "any activity directly related to harvesting,
processing, or transporting fish harvested in the exercise of a recognized
fishing right of [an Indian] tribe or to selling such fish but only if
substantially all of such harvesting was performed by members of such
tribe." 24 In general, "recognized fishing rights" means "fishing rights
secured ... by a treaty between [the] tribe and the United States or by an
Executive order or an Act of Congress." 25 Those are exactly the sort of
rights reserved to the Lummi Nation by the Treaty of Point Elliott.26
Therefore, for Section 7873 to exempt income from taxation in a
case like Warbus, (1) a fishing rights-related activity must be in opera-
tion, and (2) the income at issue must be "derived directly from" that
activity. 27 The protected activity was conceded to exist in Warbus. If the
DOI income was sufficiently connected to the treaty-protected fishing
activity, Warbus should have prevailed.
22. Not everyone would characterize what happened in Warbus as generating DOI income. The
lender was paid by BIA; it did not forgive Warbus's obligation. Nevertheless, I will use the term
"DOI" in this article for two reasons. First, the parties and the court used the term. Second, the
transaction can be re-conceptualized as DOI because BIA stepped into the lender's shoes, Warbus
effectively came to owe BIA the $13,506, an obligation that was then forgiven. In any event,
however one labels the theory for inclusion, there was unquestionably income to Warbus under
traditional notions when BIA satisfied Warbus's obligation.
23. I.R.C. § 7873(a)(1) (1994).
24. I.R.C. § 7873(b)(1).
25. I.R.C. § 7873(b)(2).
26. See supra note 10.
27. The full text of Section 7873(a)(1) refers to "income derived directly or through a qualified
Indian entity." A "qualified Indian entity" is generally an entity that is formed by a tribe to engage in
a qualified fishing activity and that meets certain specific, technical requirements-e.g., that "all of
the equity interests in the entity are owned by qualified Indian tribes, members of such tribes, or their
spouses." I.R.C. § 7873(b)(3)(A)(ii). Judge Dean concluded that the Bureau of Indian Affairs is not
such a qualified entity and that this alternative route to exemption was therefore not available to
Warbus. I do not dispute that part of the opinion.
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II. HOW THE WARBUS COURT ERRED
The issue in Warbus, simply stated, was this: Was the DOI income
of Warbus "income derived . .. directly . . . from" an activity that was
conceded to be "a fishing rights-related activity" of the Lummi Nation?
When I first saw squibs describing Warbus, my response to this question
was Why not? Warbus used the Denise W in a tribal activity that the
government agreed was a fishing rights-related activity, and the DOI
arose from the foreclosure of that boat. After studying the issue, my
response-now, I hope, a bit more thoughtful-is still Why not?
As I understand Judge Dean's opinion, he had two basic problems
with Warbus's arguments: First, there was no express exemption of the
DOI income from taxation and, second, the income was not closely
enough connected with the treaty-protected activity. In a moment I will
show why each of these is a non-problem. First, to set the stage, I will
briefly describe the so-called "canons of construction" in American
Indian law, canons that should have informed Judge Dean's opinion. If
Warbus's arguments had any merit at all, the canons should have made
his position a sure winner.
A. CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION
American Indian law is full of ambiguity: ancient treaties and
statutes do not speak in modem terms. This problem is not a new one
since the relationship of treaty and statutory language to everyday usage
has always been tenuous at best.28 Long ago, judges developed a set of
principles, the so-called "canons of construction," to deal with the
inherent ambiguity in this field.
The canons originated in treaty interpretation. Treaties with the
Indian tribes have often been likened to contracts of adhesion, the
powerful United States imposing its will on the relatively weak and
powerless tribes. Everything, including the language used in the "nego-
tiations" and final document, favored the United States at the expense of
the tribes. To implement those treaties in a fair and reasonable way,
judges must try to understand what the affected tribal officials thought
they were agreeing to, or would have thought if they had been able to
imagine the nature of twentieth century controversies, regardless of the
28. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth "-How Long a Time is That?,
63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975).
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actual treaty language used. As Chief Justice John Marshall made the
point in Worcester v. Georgia:29
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be
construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of, which
are susceptible of a more extended meaning than their plain
import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should
be considered as used only in the latter sense. 30
More recently, the Court has concluded that "[d]oubtful expressions are
to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the
wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith."31
That principle has remained the law. The canons are phrased in dif-
ferent ways in different cases, but the basic tenets remain: Try to under-
stand provisions as the unlettered Indians would have understood them;
if there is doubt, resolve the doubt in favor of the tribes; and so on. In
general, whatever the language used, the canons encompass the following
points: "1) very liberal construction to determine whether Indian rights
exist; and 2) very strict construction to determine whether Indian rights
are to be abridged or abrogated." 32
Chief Justice Marshall was writing about interpreting treaties in
Worcester, but the canons have been extended since his day to apply to
the interpretation of statutes, executive orders, and regulations as well.
This is not a matter of choice: Judges are obligated to follow the canons.
Accordingly, if there is doubt about the language in legal authority
affecting Indian rights, that doubt must be resolved in a way favorable to
the affected tribe or the affected tribal member. It would not be overstat-
ing matters much to say that, in disputes arising from the interpretation
of treaties, statutes, and other documents, if a court sees ambiguity in the
relevant language, the position of the tribe or the tribal member will
prevail.33
In fact, the canons ought to apply in determining whether there is
an ambiguity needing resolution. 34 It is entirely consistent with the can-
ons as they have developed to require courts to look for ways to interpret
29. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
30. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
31. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
32. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 348 (3d ed. 1993).
33. Tribal interests and the interests of individual tribal members may not coincide in particular
cases. For present purposes, I put that real problem to the side; no such conflict existed in Warbus.
34. Similar debates occur in connection with "plain meaning" theories of statutory interpretation.
How much ambiguity is necessary before a court may look at something other than the statutory
language? How plain must a "plain meaning" be? Of course, critics of plain-meaning doctrines sug-
gest that judicial adherents of the doctrine see plain meaning only when doing so leads to the desired
interpretation. See William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND.
L.J. 865, 875-80 (1993).
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controlling language in favor of the affected tribe or tribal member. Put
another way: If there is a question about whether ambiguity exists, the
canons point toward finding an ambiguity, one that must then be re-
solved favorably to Indian interests.
The application of the canons may not always be clear, and judges
have circumvented the canons by purporting to find no ambiguity in
inherently ambiguous documents. However, even when that happens,
judges typically acknowledge the existence of the canons and explain
why the canons do not affect the result. 35 The canons, after all, are part
of the law. To altogether ignore the canons, and to make no attempt to
honor their commands, is unacceptable in a late twentieth century
American Indian law case.
But that is what happened in Warbus. There is no particular reason
to expect a Tax Court judge to be aware of the canons. Judges need
help in understanding areas of the law with which they are unfamiliar,
but Judge Dean was left to his own devices. Other than citing cases in
which the canons had been discussed, 36 the parties gave Judge Dean no
hint of the canons' existence. 37 The fault was not the judge's, but his
innocence does not make Warbus any more palatable as authority.
B. THE PRESUMPTION OF TAXABILITY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
AMERICAN INDIANS
With the American Indian law canons of construction as a backdrop,
I now examine Judge Dean's problems with Warbus's argument. It is
not the case,.noted Judge Dean, that a Native American's income is pre-
sumed to be exempt from federal taxation. Quite the contrary. The
judge wrote, "Tax exemptions, including those affecting native peoples,
are not granted by implication. If Congress intends to exempt certain
income, it must do so expressly." 38
That tax exemptions cannot be granted by implication is a generally
unobjectionable proposition, and American Indians are federal taxpay-
ers, except in special situations. 39 But it is not clear what that proposition
35. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 263 (1992) (applying canons generously to forbid excise tax on sale of fee land within
reservation boundaries while generally downplaying effect of canons in concluding that ad valorem
tax on such lands was permissible).
36. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); see infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
37. Indeed, Warbus's Reply Brief credited the Commissioner with having "recite[d] an unexcep-
tional history of the intersection of Indian Law with Tax Law," even though there had been no
mention of the canons in the government's brief. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-3, Warbus v. Commis-
sioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96). There was no recitation of the canons, even in boilerplate
form, in any brief. See generally id.
38. Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282-83.
39. For example, a treaty might protect members of a particular tribe from having to pay other
1998] 697
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has to do with the Warbus facts. The claim was not that Warbus's in-
come was automatically outside the reach of the Code. A claim of that
nature would have been a sure loser. 40 The claim was that Section 7873
is the express exemption that Congress has the power to grant. Facing a
plausible argument that a specific, express exemption existed, Judge
Dean should have parsed the statutory language carefully to see whether
Section 7873 applied to Warbus. Had he also been better advised about
his obligations in an American Indian law case, he should have examined
the statutory language with the canons of construction in mind.
That is what the Supreme Court did in the 1956 case Squire v.
Capoeman,41 which dealt with the tax liability of an Indian couple. The
Capoemans claimed exemption from federal income taxation on the
proceeds of timber sold from their allotted lands. They had not yet been
issued a patent in fee simple for those lands.42
Simply put, the government's primary position in Squire was that,
as American citizens, the Capoemans were subject to federal income
taxation. As the Court explained, "The government urges us to view this
case as an ordinary tax case without regard to the treaty, relevant statutes,
congressional policy concerning Indians, or the guardian-ward relation-
ship between the United States and these particular Indians." 43 While it
is true, wrote Chief Justice Warren, that "in ordinary affairs of life, not
governed by treaties or remedial legislation, [Indians] are subject to the
wise applicable federal taxes, or a statute like Section 7873 of the Code could exempt all of a tribal
member's income.
40. Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282-83. In fact, in three cases decided before the enactment of Section
7873, the Tax Court had ruled that income from treaty-protected fishing activities was taxable. See
Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 249, 252 (1988); Earl v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1014,
1020 (1982); Strom v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 621, 628 (1946), aff'd per curiam, 158 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.
1947). Congress sidestepped the status of pre-Section 7873 fishing income: "Nothing in the amend-
ments [establishing Section 7873] shall create any inference as to the existence or non-existence or
scope of any exemption from tax for income derived from fishing rights secured as of March 17, 1988
.... " Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3044(b), 102 Stat.
3342, 3642. I am not sure those cases were correctly decided, but that does not matter for this
analysis. To say that Warbus's income might have been taxable had there been no 1988 tax legislation
is not to say it should have been taxable with Section 7873 on the books.
41. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
42. Id. at 3. This is not the place for an extended discussion of allotment. It is enough for present
purposes to understand the following: Congress in the late nineteenth century enacted a number of
allotment laws, which were intended to break up the Indian land mass and convert the American
Indians into yeoman farmers. When applicable, the acts "allotted" 80 or 160 acre parcels to
individual Indians. The parcels were to stay in trust until the passage of a certain period of time or
until the Indian became "competent," i.e., was deemed fit to become a citizen, at which time the
individual was to be issued a patent for the land by the federal government. In most cases, the land
passed out of Indian hands altogether; the allotment acts were disastrous for American Indians as a
whole. But in many particular cases the trust period was extended. Since 1934 no patents have been
issued for allotted lands; lands held in trust at that time have continued to be held in trust. The
Capoemans held land that had been allotted to Mr. Capoeman, and they therefore had a special tie to
that land. However, they did not have, and would never have, fee simple title. Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 5-6.
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payment of income taxes as are other citizens," 44 Squire v. Capoeman
was no ordinary tax case.
The Capoemans' situation was not ordinary because there were
statutory provisions, relating to allotted lands, that arguably exempted
their timber income. Therefore, the Court examined provisions of the
General Allotment Act of 188745 and a 1906 amendment to that Act,46
enactments that defined the nature of the Capoemans' interest in the
lands from which the timber had been taken. The General Allotment
Act could be interpreted as precluding all taxation of allotted land until a
patent had been issued. It was only after the issuance of a patent that
"all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be
removed." 47 This language suggested to the Court "a congressional
intent to subject an Indian allottee to all taxes only after a patent in fee is
issued to the allottee." 48
Indeed, said the Court, if there was any doubt about how the Gener-
al Allotment Act should be read in these circumstances, the canons of
construction removed that doubt. With the "doubtful expressions" of
the Act read favorably to the Capoemans, 49 no federal tax could be
imposed on income from the allotted land. Moreover, relying on
writings of Indian law scholar Felix Cohen, the Court interpreted the
exemption to apply to "income derived directly" from the land, 50 a
category that included the net proceeds from the timber sales.
Like Judge Dean in Warbus, the Squire Court accepted the general
proposition that "exemptions to tax laws should be clearly ex-
pressed." 5 1 But that proposition merely begins the analysis. In an
Indian law context, individuals searching for "express" exemptions
must do their research mindful of the canons of construction. 52 The
44. Id. at 6.
45. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
46. Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349).
47. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994) (emphasis added). In its nearly full form, the proviso to Section 6 of
the General Allotment Act, as amended, reads as follows:
That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is authorized, whenever
he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing his or
her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and
thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be
removed ....
Id.
48. Squire, 351 U.S. at 7.
49. See Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
50. Squire, 351 U.S. at 9 (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 265 (1942)).
51. Id. at 6.
52. The effects of the canons can be tempered in some special situations. For example, once
Congress acts to clearly make land subject to state taxation, reacquisition of the land by a tribe will not
exempt the land from taxation. Congress must make any new exemption "unmistakably clear." Cass
County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 118 S. Ct. 1904, 1910 (1998).
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Supreme Court in Squire analyzed the controlling statutes in a way
favorable to the Indian taxpayers to see whether an "express"
exemption existed; that's what Warbus should have asked the Tax Court
to do in Warbus.53 Instead, he punted. 54
All of which brings us to the interpretation of Section 7873, the
claimed express exemption in Warbus. I will argue that the canons of
construction were not necessary to find an "express" exemption for
Warbus's DOI income, since Section 7873 is clear enough on its own
terms. However, whether that argument is right or not, the canons should
have made this an easy case for the taxpayer.
C. SECTION 7873: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN INCOME AND
"ACTIVITY"
Section 7873 lends itself to good old-fashioned statutory analysis of
a sort that tax lawyers do every day.
1. The Structure of Section 7873
Warbus, Judge Dean wrote, "argue[d] that the purchase of the
Denise W and expenditures for associated equipment and operating
expenses are fishing-rights related and that therefore the income from
discharge of indebtedness incurred to meet these expenses is
fishing-rights related." 55 What precisely is the problem with that argu-
ment?
Since the government had conceded that a "fishing rights-related
activity" existed, the problem had to be that Warbus's DOI income was
insufficiently connected with that activity. In Judge Dean's words, the
DOI income was the "result of the freeing of [Warbus's] assets from
obligations by the BIA in 1993, not from any activity by him 'directly
related' to harvesting, processing, transporting, or selling fish in the
exercise of recognized fishing rights of an Indian tribe." 56 This is the
passage that I would like to focus on in the Warbus opinion.
To begin with, Judge Dean garbled the statutory language. Com-
pare the Warbus quotation, with its reference to "activity by him" and
53. Squire, 351 U.S. at 6-8. Particularly when the canons of construction are applied, the usual
requirement that an exemption from taxation be "express" should not be interpreted to mean "beyond
any doubt." That someone can come up with a different spin on statutory language should not mean,
by itself, that a provision is not "express."
54. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-3, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-
96) ("Petitioner Warbus agrees that, absent some expressed exemption found in statute or treaty,
Indians are subject to the federal income tax laws the same as any other citizens.").
55. Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282.
56. Id. at 283 (note omitted).
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the quotation marks around "directly related," 57 with the actual lan-
guage of Section 7873.58 The statute does not include the words "by
him." 59 As I discuss below, Judge Dean improperly personalized the
"activity" requirement. Moreover, the "directly related" phrase that
Judge Dean highlighted is merely part of the definition of "fishing
rights-related activity," and that definition was not at issue in Warbus.
Because the government had conceded that a qualifying activity existed,
the only question should have been whether the income at issue was
"derived . . . directly . . . from" the qualifying activity. None of the
language in the quoted passage addresses that portion of Section 7873.
Suppose Warbus had been able to show that he purchased the boat,
paid expenses, and therefore incurred the associated debt only for the
purpose of engaging in the Lummi Nation's treaty-protected activity. If
he could have shown that-a position which the government largely
conceded 60-surely that would have been enough of a connection to
make the DOI income tax-exempt.
Or would it? If I am reading the passage from Judge Dean's opin-
ion correctly, one of his concerns was the relative passivity of the DOI
income; for all we know, Warbus may have been asleep at the precise
moment the DOI income was realized. I interpret Judge Dean's phrase
"from any activity by him" as drawing this activity versus passivity
distinction. It does not matter, that is, why the Denise W was acquired
and how it was used; it does not matter why the borrowing occurred. If
so, Warbus would mean that DOI income can never be Section 7873 in-
come.
If that is what he meant, Judge Dean misunderstood the word
"activity" in Section 7873. Return to the statutory language: "income
derived . . . directly . . . from a fishing rights-related activity." 6 1 The
"activity" required by the statute is the "fishing rights-related activity,"
which includes "harvesting, processing, or transporting fish harvested in
the exercise of a recognized fishing right." 62 The statutory language is
57. See supra text and accompanying note 56.
58. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
59. In another part of the opinion, Judge Dean used language almost identical to the language
quoted above, but without the nonstatutory phrase "by him." See Warbus. 110 T.C. at 283.
60. See Respondent's Brief in Answer at 12-13, Warbus v.Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998)
(No. 2194-96) (citations omitted):
It is not disputed in this case that Petitioner obtained the $50,000 loan, which the BIA
satisfied in 1993, primarily to obtain funds for use in Petitioner's treaty fishing
rights-related activity. It is not disputed that the Denise W, the asset which secured this
$50,000 loan, was utilized in Petitioner's treaty fishing rights-related activity. Further, it is
not disputed that Petitioner was engaged in a treaty fishing rights-related activity from
1986 to 1991, the time during which the Denise W was operated by petitioner.
61. I.R.C. § 7873(a)(1).
62. I.R.C. § 7873(b)(1).
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as clear as it can be that the required "activity" is the overall structure of
treaty-protected behavior that a tribe engages in and from which tribal
members derive income: "from a fishing rights-related activity of such
tribe."6 3 The requirement that there be such an activity was satisfied in
Warbus; the government had conceded the point for the Lummi Nation.
In the passage quoted above, Judge Dean would instead have us ask
whether the income was "from any activity by [Warbus] . . . 'directly
related' to a [treaty-protected activity]." That is too much activity for
me,64 and it is more activity than Section 7873 requires. By mixing up
the "activity" requirement and the "income derived directly" require-
ment of Section 7873, Judge Dean effectively rewrote the statutory pro-
vision. Section 7873 focuses on the connection of the income with the
protected activity, not on whether the particular taxpayer is doing physi-
cal activity at the time an item of income is earned or an expenditure is
made.
2. The Meaning of "Activity" in Other Code Sections
Judge Dean's conception of the term "activity" does not fit Sec-
tion 7873, and it is not supported by the way the term is used elsewhere
in the Code.65 To make that point, I will discuss the oxymoronic passive
activity loss (PAL) rules of Section 469, enacted in 1986, only two years
before the passage of Section 7873, and the at-risk rules of Section 465,
enacted in 1976 but significantly extended in 1986.66 These two Code
sections were the primary, and largely successful, weapons used against
abusive tax shelters.
I am going to try, as simply as possible, to show that use of the term
"activity" in an Internal Revenue Code provision does not necessarily
mean that a taxpayer must be engaged in vigorous exercise to be subject
to the statute. Indeed, the PAL rules would make no sense with such a
requirement. To have an interest in a passive activity, and therefore to
be subject to Section 469, requires that a taxpayer not be personally
63. I.R.C. § 7873(a)(1).
64. 1 agree with the statement usually attributed, probably erroneously, to Robert Maynard
Hutchins: "Every time I think about exercise, I lie down until the thought passes."
65. Judge Dean made no reference to the term's use elsewhere. This failure (and it is a failure)
was not entirely his fault. As with the canons of construction, he received no help from the parties.
On the other hand, interpreting Code language is part of his job.
66. Whatever the empirical validity of the assumption that members of Congress have any
knowledge of the language used in other Code provisions, that assumption is made all the time by
courts. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988) ("We generally
presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts.").
This is an assumption that seems particularly appropriate when a term, like "activity," was used in
1988 legislation, only two years after it was a centerpiece of the widely noted PAL rules.
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active. 67 The at-risk rules also were intended to attack certain loss-
generating investments, denominated "activities," in which investors
were likely to be personally inactive.
a. Passive Activity Loss (PAL) Rules
Suppose a taxpayer-doctor has a loss attributable to his interest as
limited partner in a limited partnership that engages in a trade or busi-
ness. There is, by definition, activity going on, but the taxpayer does not
participate very much, if at all, in the activity. That is the quintessential
interest in a passive activity, a trade or business in which the taxpayer
does not materially participate, 68 and that is the sort of loss-generating
investment Section 469 addresses.
Section 469 made losses from passive "activities" much less valu-
able than they had been under pre-Tax Reform Act of 1986 law, in that
such losses can be used only to offset income from passive activities.69
The doctor cannot use his PALs to currently offset his active income
from medical practice, nor can he use the passive losses to offset his port-
folio income, the dividends, interest, and so on he earns from his invest-
ments. 70 He can carry the currently unusable losses forward to use when
he has generated additional passive activity income 71 but, all other things
being equal, deferred losses are not as valuable as currently usable ones.
By limiting the utility of PALs, Section 469 made investments in
loss-generating passive activities much less attractive than had been the
case before 1986.72
Now suppose our hypothetical limited partnership recognizes some
DOI income associated with the trade or business it conducts. The doc-
tor's limited partnership interest remains an interest in a passive activity.
67. Of course, taxpayers generally do not want to be subject to Section 469: those with losses do
not want the losses limited by the PAL rules. But a taxpayer with PALs that would otherwise not be
currently deductible wants income to be characterized as coming from a passive activity.
68. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1) (1994). Material participation is defined in Section 469(h)(1). Interests in
limited partnerships are presumptively interests in passive activities. I.R.C. § 469(h)(2).
69. Section 469(a)(1) disallows the deduction of a "passive activity loss," which is defined as the
excess of losses from passive activities over income from passive activities. I.R.C. § 469(d)(1). The
effect is that losses from passive activities may be deducted currently to offset any income from
passive activities.
70. Section § 469(e)(1) defines such income as not being from a passive activity.
71. I.R.C. § 469(b). When a taxpayer disposes of substantially his entire interest in a passive
activity in a fully taxable transaction, (e.g., by selling the limited partnership interest), he can then
deduct the previously suspended losses. I.R.C. § 469(g)(1) (defining such losses as not from a passive
activity).
72. As a result, doctors will not passively invest in such activities to generate losses to offset their
medical income. Section 469 has been so effective because it has largely eliminated the objectionable
behavior to which the provision would otherwise apply.
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Can DOI income attributable to such a passive activity be income
from a passive activity to our hypothetical limited partner? Absolutely,
if the connection with the passive activity is shown. 73 That is, the income
can be associated with an activity even though the taxpayer is completely
inactive; that is the very nature of income from a passive activity. 74 And
that is one of the lessons to transfer to the analysis of Section 7873.
DOI income is neither inherently active nor inherently passive; its
character under Section 469 depends on the nature of the activity to
which it is allocated. That characterization has almost nothing to do with
the extent of the actual efforts involved in generating the DOI income.
Under the PAL rules, the extent of a taxpayer's participation is signifi-
cant in determining whether his interest is a passive activity-does he
materially participate?-but the characterization of a particular item of
income or loss is not determined by looking at the taxpayer's level of
effort with respect to that item. It is simply, or sometimes not so simply,
a matter of determining whether the income is attributable to the passive,
or non-passive, activity.
b. At-Risk Rules
Another example of the use of "activity" can be found in the
at-risk rules of Section 465, Congress' first attack on tax shelters. In
general, Section 465 in general limits a taxpayer's ability to take deduc-
tions relating to an "activity" to the amount that the taxpayer has "at
risk" in the activity. 75 As is true with the PAL rules, the at-risk rules
make certain sorts of deductions much less valuable than used to be the
case (in general, deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt and other
risk-limiting arrangements used in almost all abusive tax shelters). 76 One
does not avoid being subject to Section 465's limitations by arguing that
one is inactive. In addition, income, including DOI income, can be
73. See Rev. Rul. 92-92, 1992-2 C.B. 103 (discussing allocation of DOI income between passive
activity expenditures and other expenditures). The focus is allocation "at the time indebtedness is
discharged." Characterization of income as passive would generally be a good thing for taxpayers
who have otherwise nondeductible PALs. See supra note 67; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-22-008 (Feb.
22, 1995) (holding DOI income to be investment income on the facts).
74. Would DOI income attributable to an activity not be income from a passive activity if the
taxpayer materially participates in the activity? Again the answer is Yes. DOI income can clearly be
treated as income from a "trade or business," a term that presupposes the existence of activity.
Section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides for special deferral rules for DOI income
in special circumstances, assumes that DOI income can be associated with a trade or business.
75. I.R.C. § 465(a)(1) (1994). Taxpayers are generally at risk for the amount of cash and the
adjusted basis of property contributed to the activity, and for the amount of borrowing for which they
are personally liable. Taxpayers are not at risk for amounts borrowed on a non-recourse basis. See
I.R.C. § 465(b), (c).
76. This is not to say that nonrecourse debt is necessarily abusive. It is to say that abusive shelters
routinely used nonrecourse debt, or what purports to be nonrecourse debt.
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attributable to an "activity" even though a particular taxpayer's efforts
in the activity are minimal or nonexistent.
The relevant determination under the PAL and at-risk rules is
whether the DOI income relates to an "activity." The question is not
whether the particular taxpayer engaged in a certain level of activity with
respect to that one income item. There is no apparent reason why the
same analysis should not apply under Section 7873,
3. Connection of DOI Income with the Lummi Nation
"Activity"
We know that there was a "fishing rights-related activity" in War-
bus, since the government conceded that point. The appropriate ques-
tion, the only question, should have been whether the DOI income was
"derived . . . directly . . . from" that activity, not whether Warbus was
"active" in generating the DOI income.
It would not strain the statutory language at all to see DOI income
attributable to the foreclosure of a fishing boat acquired for use in a
"fishing rights-related activity" as being "derived directly from" that
activity, just as DOI income can be income from a passive activity. If
that was Warbus's situation, and it is consistent with what we know of
the facts, 77 he should have won. Such an interpretation of Section 7873
would not create serious opportunities for manipulation by members of
treaty-protected tribes. The connection between the DOI income in
Warbus and the protected activity was hardly imaginary. 78 And it would
not create tax shelter opportunities that Wall Street could take advantage
of.79
One should not interpret the "derived directly from" language in
Section 7873, particularly when read with the canons of construction, as
requiring an impossibly difficult showing of a connection between the
77. See supra note 50.
78. The government emphasized that Section 7873 should not be used to confer "tax-free status
on other income derived by Indians from other sources." Respondent's Brief in Answer at 12,
Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96) (quoting Hearings on S. 1239 Before the
Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. of Finance, 100th Cong. 13 (1988)
(statement of Dennis E. Ross, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy)). That
principle is unobjectionable as a general matter, but it is hard to see how holding this DOI income
exempt-income from foreclosure of a fishing boat-would create opportunities to exempt income
from other sources.
79. At least I do not think it would, but one should never underestimate the creativity of tax
planners: "The tax bar is the repository of the greatest ingenuity in America, and given the chance,
those people will do you in." Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and
Acquisitions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982) (testimony of Martin D. Ginsburg) (4luoted in Jonathan L.
Entin, Privacy, Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel Law Reform, 38 MERCER L. REV. 835, 835
(1987)).
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income at issue and the protected activity. That was not the purpose
behind the language. It was intended to require allocation between ex-
empt income and non-exempt income-not all fishing income is neces-
sarily exempt to a tribal member-not to impose unsuperable burdens of
proof. The Senate Report on the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988,80 which included the new Section 7873, notes that the Act
"exempts only that income 'derived' from fishing rights-related activi-
ties. Thus, . . . individual tribal members . . . are required under the bill
to allocate income and expenses among fishing rights-related activities
and all other activities." 81 Fair enough: the "directly derived" rule is
an allocation rule, not a burden of proof provision. Life is made up of
activities, and it is necessary to allocate income items, like DOI income,
among those activities. 82 The report then contains an example of when
allocation is required:
If ... an individual tribal member derives 60 percent of his or
her gross income in a taxable year from fishing in protected
waters and the remaining 40 percent from fishing outside
protected waters, then 60 percent of the member's income
would be exempt from tax ... and any expenses . . .
attributable to such exempt income could not be used to offset
gross income derived from fishing outside prohibited waters or
any other income.83
If Warbus had used the Denise W in part for treaty-protected fishing, and
in part for other purposes, then some of the DOI income should not have
been exempt.
But except for one obscure footnote 84 in a Senate Finance Commit-
tee report, a footnote that is hardly controlling, 85 nothing in the statutory
80. Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
81. S. REP. No. 100-445, at 475 (1988).
82. Which is to say that DOI income is attributable to some activity.
83. S. REP. No. 100-445, at 475.
84. To fans of footnotes, "obscure footnote" is not redundant.
85. The footnote stated that an entity should not fail the 90% test to be a "qualified Indian entity"
in a particular year "solely by reason of extraordinary and nonrecurring events, such as the sale of a
boat or other property." S. REP. No. 100-445, at 474 n.141. The 90% test provides, somewhat
simplified, that a qualified Indian entity must derive 90% or more of its annual gross receipts "from
fishing rights-related activities of one or more qualified Indian tribes." I.R.C. § 7873(b)(3)(A)(iii)
(1994); see also supra note 27 (discussing qualified Indian entities). Treating boat sales specially was
necessary,. argued the government, because net sales proceeds were understood not to be "from
fishing rights-related activities." Without the special rule, a boat sale could therefore have
disqualified an otherwise qualified entity. If boat sales proceeds are not Section 7873 income, the
government continued, neither is income attributable to a boat's foreclosure. Respondent's Brief in
Answer at 12-13, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96). The government's
argument has some force, but it gives much too much weight to what is, after all, a footnote in a report
on a tangential issue. The purpose of the 90% test is to determine whether an entity is a qualified
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language or the legislative history suggests that all $13,506 of DOI
income should have been automatically taxable.
Perhaps there are weak spots in this analysis at some level; lawyers
can pick holes in almost any argument. But with the canons of construc-
tion as reinforcements, I am confident that any manufactured doubts
should have been resolved favorably to Warbus. The Supreme Court in
Squire v. Capoeman interpreted similar "derived directly" language
liberally (although, in that case, a phrase interpreting statutory language
rather than a phrase taken from the controlling statute) to hold some of a
tribal member's income exempt from federal income taxation. 86
In Judge Dean's defense, there are facts in Warbus that could
reasonably have given the court pause on the statutory interpretation
issue. The borrowing occurred in 1984, a couple of years before War-
bus participated in the fishing activity of the tribe. Perhaps that is a
significant fact although, if so, one wishes that the judge would have
explained its significance. 87 In addition, the DOI income was not recog-
nized until 1993, a couple of years after Warbus had ceased participating
in the activity. Perhaps that too is a relevant fact (although, again, one
would like to know why). 88
Indian entity; it has nothing to do with whether an individual's income is attributable to treaty activity.
In addition, the footnote's purpose is to suggest that, consistent with the canons, the apparently
all-or-nothing test to be a qualified Indian entity should not be applied in a draconian way. It would
turn the canons on their head to use this passage to restrict exemption under Section 7873. Finally, for
what it is worth, gain from the sale of an asset and DOI income are not the same thing. Cf. I.R.C. §
108(a) (1994) (permitting deferral of DOI income but not gain in some circumstances).
86. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
87. Maybe he did so indirectly. Judge Dean noted that:
even had petitioner's loan proceeds been income in the first instance in 1984 [i.e., the
year of borrowing], their source was not activity directly related to harvesting,
processing, transporting, or selling fish in the exercise of recognized fishing rights of an
Indian tribe. Forgiveness of the repayment of those loan proceeds by a third party cannot
convert the freeing of petitioner's assets into fishing-rights-related income merely
because the loan proceeds were used to purchase equipment used in such an activity.
Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279, 284 (1998). Putting aside the judge's continued conflation of
the "derived directly from" and the "activity" tests, I suppose that passage can be interpreted as
attaching significance to the fact that the borrowing preceded Warbus's participation in the tribal
fishing activity: that is, the borrowing, had it otherwise been taxable, would not have been protected by
Section 7873 (which did not exist in 1984); a later discharge of the indebtedness therefore should not
escape taxation. Even if that is what Judge Dean meant, he was not necessarily right. The DOI
income must be analyzed under Section 7873. The income was not realized until 1993; since it was
not "secured as of March 17, 1988," it was not governed by pre-1988 Act law. See Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3044(b), 102 Stat. 3342, 3642 (codified at
26 U.S.C. § 7873 (1994)) (quoting language of 1988 Act, § 3044(b)).
88. Surely DOI income attributable to a taxpayer's passive activity would continue to be income
from a passive activity even if it were recognized after the underlying trade or business ceased. Cf.
I.R.C. § 469(f)(1) (1994) (permitting carried-over deductions from a former passive activity--e.g.,
because the taxpayer's level of participation has increased-to offset income from the no-longer-
passive activity).
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III. A FINAL CANON SHOT
As I read Section 7873, Warbus had good arguments in support of
his position even without the canons of construction. If we apply the
canons, as we are obligated to do, the result is an easy one: DOI income
arising from the foreclosure of a boat used in a treaty-protected fishing
activity is exempt.
A skeptical reader might suggest that the canons should not have
been applied in Warbus because the Section 7873 issue was not a typical
"Indian rights" question. It was a tribal member rather than the Lummi
Nation who would have benefitted directly by a different result in the
case. I am not persuaded.
Section 7873 deals with traditional, treaty-protected tribal rights;
applying the statute in a narrow way to a tribal member inevitably affects
the economic well-being of the tribe. And it is not as though the canons
have been applied only in cases in which tribal rights have been directly
implicated. As we have seen, the Supreme Court, in its most important
case discussing the federal income tax liability of individual Indians,
Squire v. Capoeman,89 applied the canons as a matter of routine.90
In any event, as far as I can tell, Warbus was not the result of a
principled determination that the canons were irrelevant. No such
determination could have been made; the judge was not aware of the
canons' existence. The failure to apply the canons may not have been
Judge Dean's fault, but it was a failing. As a result, the opinion in
Warbus is an inherently incomplete analysis. That fact by itself should
give us pause in relying on the Warbus opinion in future cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The world is not necessarily made up of purely American Indian
law cases or purely tax cases. Sometimes apparently discrete bodies of
law intersect, and courts, practitioners, and scholars must deal with that
overlap. Warbus should have been such a case.
Unfortunately, counsel for Warbus merely noted the "intersection
of Indian Law with Tax Law" 91 and then did little or nothing to help
Judge Dean deal with that intersection. It would not have taken much.
89. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
90. Although the tribal members lost in each case, the canons were nominally applied in the pre-
Section 7873 cases considering the federal income taxation of income derived from treaty-protected
fishing. See supra note 40.
91. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96).
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A boilerplate recitation of the canons of construction would have helped
alert the judge to the American Indian law implications of the case.
I am not sure why Warbus turned into such a disaster. Part of the
problem, I suspect, is that it was not a big dollar case. The tax due on
$13,506 of income, after taking into account the effects of standard
deductions, personal exemptions, and low marginal rates, is very small.
A case of this sort will therefore not elicit the legal effort that the larger
issues might justify, and some of the technical issues would have taken
substantial time to develop.
On the other hand, very little effort was necessary to get the Ameri-
can Indian law issues on the table. If nothing else, Warbus illustrates the
dangers in having individual Indians litigating issues that affect larger,
tribal interests. Section 7873 of the Code has important effects on tribal
members who engage in protected fishing, but the ultimate beneficiaries
are the tribes. Exempting members' income from federal income taxa-
tion promotes the economic position of tribes. Warbus's inadequate
arguments led to an incredibly limited understanding of the income
eligible for exemption, and it is tribal interests that will suffer if Warbus
is taken seriously as precedent.
Obviously the Warbus opinion cannot be airbrushed out of the legal
picture;92 it is there in print (and on line) for us to ponder and criticize.
But we should get as close as we possibly can to the effect of airbrush-
ing: the next time a court hears a Section 7873 issue it should act as if
Warbus had never been decided.
92. Cf. DAVID KING, THE COMMISSAR VANISHES: THE FALSIFICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS AND ART IN
STALIN'S RUSSIA (1997).
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